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Construction of Gender and National
Identity in Turkey: Images of the First
Lady in the Turkish Media (2002–7)
MERAL UGUR C_INAR*
Gender roles are dynamic constructs. These constructs are not only shaped by for-
mally institutionalized gender inequalities but also informally such as through the
media. The media is a prime example because it defines identities, establishes parame-
ters of consensus, and relegates what is perceived as unconventional to the margins.1
Taking this into account, this article is concerned with the role media plays in con-
structing gender identities with a closer look at how depictions of First Ladies serve
to perpetuate and contest dominant notions of gender and national identity in
Turkey. This study is based on an analysis of the online content of two Turkish main-
stream newspapers, Zaman andH€urriyet, between 18 November 2002 and 29 August
2007.2 Zaman, currently the best-selling Turkish newspaper, is representative of an
Islamist viewpoint and it is known to be close to the pro-Islamist Justice and Devel-
opment Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) government during the period
covered in this article.3 H€urriyet is the biggest mainstream daily newspaper4 and has
the most visited Turkish newspaper website.5 It belongs to Dogan Medya, Turkey’s
leading media and entertainment corporation.6
The selected time frame (18 November 2002–29 August 2007) includes immense
changes in Turkish politics. It covers the first time a religious party, AKP, formed a
single-party government in Turkey.7 The wives of most AKP parliamentarians and
cabinet members (including Prime Minister Erdogan’s wife Emine Erdogan) are
veiled, which caused tension with secularist groups. Moreover, the presidential elec-
tions, which brought Abdullah G€ul to office on 28 August 2007 and made Hayr€unnisa
G€ul the first veiled president’s wife in Turkey, were surrounded by debates regarding
the appropriateness of a veiled First Lady in Turkey as well as broader debates on
Islamism, secularism and the place of Turkey in the world. As we will see, not only
current First Ladies, but also previous ones have been used as ‘yardsticks’ in these
debates. Hence, all prime ministers’ and presidents’ wives are included in this study.8
Our analysis will reveal that despite their different worldviews, both Zaman and
H€urriyet have striking similarities when it comes to gender roles. While both newspa-
pers endorse female education and certain public roles for women, the agency of
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women in the public sphere is limited by the symbolic duties they are expected to per-
form, which are tied to the national image the newspapers deem fit for the country.
Moreover, in both newspapers, First Ladies, as wives of politically powerful men,
are expected to act primarily as domestic characters. Unlike the public sphere, where
First Ladies mostly exist as symbols of national identity, they are assigned to the pri-
vate sphere as their primary domain.
The role of media images of First Ladies is central to analysing how gender roles
are shaped and perpetuated through the media, as First Ladies represent the charac-
teristics of contemporary ‘womanhood’, ‘being both a “Lady” and the “First” one at
that’.9 The lack of academic studies on Turkish First Ladies is hard to explain given
the potential such studies hold. The Turkish case stands as a unique example among
western and Middle Eastern countries. First, compared to many other Middle East-
ern countries, Turkish nationalism has a different relationship to westernization. As
Acar and G€uneş-Ayata argue, perhaps due to the lack of a colonial history, Turkish
nationalism lies in contrast to postcolonial nationalisms. Whereas in previously colo-
nized countries gender reforms could be viewed as vestiges of the West, in the Turk-
ish case, the image of the westernized woman became the keystone in creating the
nation-state identity in Turkey.10
The Turkish case provides an interesting example when compared to other western
countries as well. In her analysis of the role of women in nationalism projects, Anne
McClintock argues that women ‘are represented as the atavistic and authentic
“body” of national tradition (inert, backward-looking, and natural) embodying
nationalism’s conservative principle of continuity’.11 While this might be true for
many western countries, the Turkish case presents a more complex example of how
gender hierarchies operate, as women played a crucial role in the early efforts of the
founders of the Turkish Republic to break with the past and create a modern and
western national identity.12 For instance, unlike their French predecessors, Turkish
revolutionaries saw women’s emancipation as central to Turkish nationalism, prog-
ress and civilization.13 The new regime also gave women important responsibilities in
the modernization and secularization mission as it envisioned an ideal republican
woman, whose body and practices needed to comply with the modern, secular, west-
ernized vision.14 Hence, the role of women in the Turkish modernization project
shows us a different picture than the one presented by McClintock where women are
judged by the norm of preserving tradition.
The Turkish case also diverges from many western counterparts due to the specific
role it assigns to women in the public sphere. Unlike the West, where the public sphere
was originally a sphere reserved for men with property, the Turkish mode of moderni-
zation cherished women’s public visibility.15 Women were granted equal rights of
divorce, inheritance and child custody (1926); and the right to vote at local (1930) and
national elections (1934). With the encouragement and endorsement of Atat€urk, for
example, his adopted daughters Sabiha Go kçen and Ayşe Afetinan became the world’s
first female fighter pilot and the prime historian of Turkish official history, respectively.
As Kandiyoti argues, Atat€urk’s choice to adopt daughters in a society where preference
for male children was the norm carried a heavy symbolic significance.16
The unique situation of Turkey vis-a-vis the West, women’s emancipation and reli-
gion makes it an interesting case to analyse in order to enhance our understanding of
the interplay between media representations, nationalist projects and gender
































hierarchies. While the role of women in Turkey’s modernization gives them unique
opportunities, it also means that women’s struggle in Turkey is fought on two differ-
ent fronts: to break the confines of the domestic field as their primary domain and to
gain agency as active citizens in the public sphere. The contestations from the 1980s
onward between secularism and Islamism further complicated the picture as we will
see from our analysis of Zaman and H€urriyet. Before we turn to our analysis, how-
ever, it is useful to make a brief introduction to the historical background of the ten-
sion between the secularists and Islamists, whose views are represented in H€urriyet
and Zaman, respectively.
The last decades of the Ottoman Empire were a playground for westernism, modern-
ism and Islam. With the new Republic (1923), pro-western and secularist ideals
become dominant. The ruling elite switched to the Latin alphabet, western units of
measurement and Sunday as the day of rest. In addition, the role of Islam in the pub-
lic sphere was minimized: the Caliphate was abolished (1924), Islamic law repealed
(1926) and Islam as the religion of the state revoked (1928). The state promoted a
certain vision of Islam which suggested that religion is a matter of personal con-
science and should not be expressed in the public sphere. Failing to act in this manner
was considered reactionary and a sign of disloyalty to the new regime.
There was little political opposition to the secularist configuration in Turkey in the
early decades of the Republic. This began to change in the 1980s as Islam became an
‘effective and strong political, economic and cultural force’.17 Turkish society under-
went tremendous transformation in this era particularly due to the neoliberal eco-
nomic policies that integrated Turkey into the world economy. Expectations for
freedom of enterprise also brought expectations for freedom of expression, which pro-
vided an opportunity for Islamic forces to legitimize their cause at the national level.18
Among demands for more rights to express religious identities, the headscarf
gained prominence. Unlike male attire, which was regulated by the Hat Law (1925),
there was no such nationwide regulation regarding female citizens in the early years
of the Republic. Yet local administrations could enforce unveiling. In the 1980s, the
headscarf ban became stricter as more veiled female students started to attend uni-
versities. In 1989, the Constitutional Court decided that wearing headscarves in pub-
lic institutions is against secularism, which is an essential element of the regime.
Attempts by the current AKP government to lift the headscarf ban were annulled by
the Constitutional Court in 2008.19 The ban on wearing the headscarf in the civil ser-
vice was lifted in September 2013. However, this excludes judges, prosecutors, the
police and military personnel.
As newly assumed Islamic identities gained public visibility mainly through women’s
headscarves,20 this public visibility upset the dominant notion that the public sphere
should be free of religious symbols. Moreover, protests in favour of headscarves
heightened the threat perceptions among secularists who saw headscarves as symbols
of an alternative hegemonic political project and feared that ‘their life-world may be
encroached upon and threatened’.21 Even though it is not as heightened as in the
2002–7 period, the tension around veiling still remains.
After a brief historical background, we will now turn to our analyses of images of
the First Lady in Zaman and H€urriyet in relation to the debates on modernity and

































In an atmosphere where the ‘civilizational’ premise of the ideal republican
woman22 is still central to the debates on Turkishness, First Ladies are under strict
media scrutiny. Images of the First Lady are central for both those who support a
secular and westernized country and those who envision a pro-Islamist societal
order. It is noteworthy to see that one founding ideal of the republic is still alive not
only inH€urriyet but also in Zaman. In both newspapers, public campaigns for female
literacy led by Semra Sezer (the wife of the former president Ahmet Necdet Sezer
(2000–2007)) and Emine Erdogan are cited in detail.23
H€urriyet puts a lot more emphasis on women’s education as a central credential for
First Ladies; if First Ladies have received higher education, this does not go unno-
ticed.24 In addition to this, both newspapers cite the demands of First Ladies such as
Emine Erdogan, Semra Sezer and Hayr€unnisa G€ul for more women’s rights.25 Yet
the agreement between Zaman and H€urriyet on the public role of First Ladies seems
to end here. Both newspapers enter into the struggle about Islam, secularism and
nationhood through images of the First Lady. The focal points of this struggle are
the attitudes, habits and clothing of First Ladies. H€urriyet depicts an ideal First
Lady as someone who is modern and can compete in modernity and civilization with
her western counterparts. H€urriyet shows how Turkish First Ladies internalized the
values of modernization through their participation in public life. For example,
H€urriyet writes that the greatest pleasure for Mevhibe In€on€u was riding a horse with
her husband Ismet Ino n€u (second president of Turkey, 1938–50) and that she also
liked to drive a car.26 The same piece also stresses the horse-riding theme in the case
of Latife Uşakki, the wife of Ataturk, the founder of the Republic, from 29 January
1923 until their divorce on 5 August 1925.
Zaman, on the other hand, stresses the more religious aspects of First Ladies’ lives.
For instance, the columnist Mustafa Armagan says that Reşide Hanım (wife of the
third president, Celal Bayar (1950–60)) always prayed five times a day.27 In addition
to this, Zaman finds it newsworthy when First Ladies such as Semra Sezer and
Rahşan Ecevit,28 who are not in fact veiled but on the contrary are wives of secularist
politicians, cover their heads, for instance when they go into a mosque or to a
funeral.29
As the cornerstone of Turkish modernist transformation,30 clothing is at the centre
of public debates and it constitutes the field in which the public images of First
Ladies differ the most in H€urriyet and Zaman. One of the major debates revolves
around the first Turkish First Lady, Latife Uşşaki, and whether she can be set as an
example of a veiled woman for future First Ladies. To endorse such an idea, Zaman
presents G€ul’s wife Hayr€unnisa G€ul as ‘The second veiled First Lady’, Latife Uşşaki
being the first.31 Another piece in Zaman states that not only Latife Uşşaki, but also
Mevhibe Ino n€u and Reşide Bayar, were veiled. In this piece, the columnist Mustafa
Armagan states that these women were only unveiled gradually.32 Another colum-
nist, Nedim Hazer, also writes a piece endorsing the view that Latife Uşşaki was
veiled and that this shows that the fact Hayr€unnisa G€ul is veiled is not a problem.33
In addition, the newspaper also devotes a lot of space to politicians and intellectuals
who make similar points to the columnists.34
H€urriyet columnists, on the other hand, are furious about such allegations. They
oppose it on various grounds. First of all, they say, the regulations on clothing were
introduced after Ataturk and Uşşaki were divorced.35 Second, they say that the
































historical circumstances (the Ottoman legacy in society) led Uşşaki to cover her head
in public. They also add that the headscarf did not cover all of Uşşaki’s hair and she
abandoned it altogether later on.36 The newspaper also cites an article from The Inde-
pendent that contrasts Latife Uşşaki and Emine Erdogan, showing their differen-
ces.37 Soner Yalçın even writes a hypothetical letter in the name of Latife Uşşaki
where Uşşaki responds to Erdogan. In this letter, Uşşaki states that her attire was
modern compared to the times in which she lived. She also asks Tayyip Erdogan if
Hayr€unnisa G€ul would also be willing to act in the interest of the state on the head-
scarf issue and take her headscarf off for the good of the state.38
In the struggle over the place of the headscarf in the Turkish national identity and
the debates over its legitimacy in the public sphere, the clothing of Emine Erdogan
and Hayr€unnisa G€ul are crucial. Politicians and bureaucrats, as well as many jour-
nalists, columnists and fashion designers, take part in this debate, to which the media
gives high publicity. In this regard, the clothing of Emine Erdogan and, back then,
the president’s wife Semra Sezer are often juxtaposed in H€urriyet. In one of these
pieces, the clothing of Emine Erdogan is described in detail, including her headscarf,
without praising any element of it, while in the same piece Semra Sezer is praised for
her elegance.39
More explicitly, H€urriyet columnists severely criticize Emine Erdogan for her
clothing and more directly for the headscarf she is wearing.40 Yalçın Bayer in
H€urriyet claims that because of the way she dresses, Emine Erdogan creates a ‘dowdy
Turkey’ image and her clothing provides evidence of AKP’s reluctance to modern-
ize.41 One female colmunist writes that Emine Erdogan needs to get advice from
‘fashion designers who face the West’ concluding with the statement that ‘because we
are women, we need to put more effort’.42
First Ladies are seen to represent national identity, not only for an internal but
also for an external audience. In this respect, every meeting at the international level
that is attended by Emine Erdogan and Hayr€unnisa G€ul is a source of bitterness and
anger for the columnists of H€urriyet. Erdogan and G€ul’s clothing are juxtaposed to
people such as the Swedish Queen, Syrian, Jordanian, Pakistani Malaysian, Azerbai-
jani and Turkish-Cypriot First Ladies.43 The authors are concerned with the interna-
tional image of the country and they see this picture as a threat to secularism.
Authors such as T€urenç and Ç€olaşan find the contrast between G€ul and Erdogan’s
clothing and other Muslim country First Ladies’ clothing especially insulting. Com-
paring Arab countries to Turkey, the secularist opinion leaders express their bitter-
ness when they see images where Turkey looks more ‘backward’ than these
countries. Due to the belief that modernization and democracy are only possible
through the secularization of the public sphere, Erdogan’s attire is not only seen
harmful to the image of Turkey as a secular country, but also as a modern and demo-
cratic one. The columnists find that as the vanguard country of modernization and
women’s emancipation in the Muslim world, Turkey deserves better.44
It is worth noting, however, that the secularist view does not suggest that any style
of clothing on the condition that women are unveiled is welcome. In line with
Kandiyoti’s claim that ‘the management of femininity and sexual modesty became
part and parcel of the symbolic armour of the “modern” woman’,45 First Ladies are
expected to dress in such a way that they reflect a modern Turkey that has cut its ties

































Ino n€u are noted for wearing modest clothes46 and Semra Sezer to have said that she
does not dye her hair, does not wear jewellery, prefers unadorned clothing and has
no adherence to brand names.47
Those who do not support the image of women envisioned by the founding elite
and embraced by the majority of the country but who instead want to create an alter-
native image of women in Turkey, and an alternative image of Turkey in general, see
a new opportunity in First Ladies such as G€ul and Erdogan. In contrast to the nega-
tive depictions of veiled First Ladies’ interactions in the international arena, Zaman
frames their interactions positively and praises the First Ladies for their stylishness
during these visits. It tells its readers, for instance, how admired Emine Erdogan was
in Pakistan and how her elegance was praised.48 It also points out that Emine
Erdogan was as fashionable as Queen Raina49 and elaborates on the warm welcome
Emine Erdogan received from the Bush family.50
Fashion designers join the debate as authoritative voices in defining what normal
or proper attire for a woman representing Turkey would look like aesthetically. The
issue of whether Hayr€unnisa G€ul will receive professional help from designers such
as Atıl Kutoglu in order to ‘modernize’ her headscarf preoccupied H€urriyet for a
long time.51 Similarly, H€urriyet reported that many fashion designers did not like
Emine Erdogan’s style and published suggestions by designers on how to improve it.
These suggestions were primarily concerned with how to modernize her headscarf.52
Zaman, on the other hand, praises Hayr€unnisa G€ul’s fashion tastes and states that
her fashion and makeup styles are admired by fashion designers.53 Zaman also cites
two fashion designers, Neslihan Yargıcı and Faruk Saraç, who criticize other design-
ers’ views on ‘modernizing’ G€ul’s headscarf.54 Another piece in Zaman, written by a
fashion designer, Reyhan Yazıcı, picks G€ul as the most fashionable First Lady.55
Within the debate on First Ladies’ headscarves, columnists at H€urriyet do not shy
away from demanding that Hayr€unnisa G€ul uncover her head or at least cover it in a
more ‘modern’ way (meaning, leave some of it open)56 and they invite her husband
to convince her to do so.57 The only critical voices on such interference in First
Ladies’ attire come from columnists Ahmet Hakan of H€urriyet and Nihal Bengisu
Karaca of Zaman. Ahmet Hakan wrote a series of pieces in H€urriyet criticizing those
who think that Tayyip Erdogan should urge his wife to remove her headscarf. Hakan
states that it is wrong to assume that it is Emine Erdogan’s responsibility to remove
her headscarf so that her husband can get into office. He adds that it is disrespectful
not only to Emine Erdogan but also to all women to say that ‘Tayyip Erdogan needs
to urge his wife to remove the headscarf’. It is also a sign of male oppression which
we should not approve.58 Hakan criticizes both the Islamists and the secularists for
failing to appreciate that women have an identity separate from their husbands.59 In
parallel with this, in her column in Zaman, Karaca criticizes the attitude of the two
different camps towards First Ladies. First, she criticizes radical Islamist notions
that try to exclude more moderate approaches to veiling. Second, she criticizes the
exclusionary attitudes of some secularist sectors towards these First Ladies. She fin-
ishes her piece by saying: ‘God may help those scouts who are left outside the
camps.’60 These two columnists’ voices remain very marginal compared to the overall
tone of the newspapers.
Zaman and H€urriyet’s images of the First Lady demonstrate that Çınar’s claim
that secularist and Islamist politicians have used the female body to promote their
































own national project at the expense of women’s agency applies equally to the way the
media takes part in the secularist-Islamist struggle.61
Zaman and H€urriyet’s images of the First Lady have significant implications for
the relationship between the media and beauty norms. Bartky argues that normative
femininity is centred on the woman’s body; its sexuality and its appearance,62 and
Gill maintains that women who do not conform to the media’s requirements that
they be ‘eye candy’ are subjected to vilification.63 While both Gill’s and Bartky’s
points are true, it is worth taking into account that attractiveness is not a universal
concept and the discourse surrounding it is not only culturally but also politically
specific. As this section has shown, beauty norms and gender expectations are tightly
bound with national imaginaries and meanings attached to words such as dowdy,
ugly and chic are both culturally and politically significant.
The Turkish Republic was one of the first states to extensively address the question
of women’s emancipation and grant women equal rights on many public matters,
improving the status of women in society and expanding their political rights. How-
ever, it did not alter the primarily domestic definition of the female role in Turkish
society.64 For instance, until 2002 the Civil Code designated the husband as the head
of the family, allowed the husband to choose the place of residence for the family,
and prioritized the father’s decision over custody in cases of divorce.65 Even today,
women need to take their husbands’ surnames.66 Moreover, a woman’s record in the
population register is carried over and placed under her husband’s family register
after marriage.67 As a result of this forced change in surname and population registry
through marriage, the official records and genealogy of the woman are uprooted and
she is literally transferred to the family of her husband.
As we shall see below, media images in Zaman and H€urriyet reinforce the notion
that the private sphere is the primary field designated for women and they keep gen-
der inequality intact. Both newspapers uncritically promote depictions of First
Ladies that emphasize their domestic features and show them as willingly embracing
this domestic role together with the gender hierarchy it embodies. In this context, the
household duties of the First Ladies are brought to the fore. For example, regarding
Melahat G€ursel,68 H€urriyet states that she defined herself primarily as a cook, among
other things, and that she preferred to do the cooking herself and sewing was her
favourite activity.69 Similarly, Zaman elaborates on the details of the teas Emine
Erdogan prepares for her husband,70 while at the same time stating that Rahsan Ece-
vit runs the kitchen at home.71 The most recent example is Zaman’s praise of Hay-
r€unnisa G€ul as the person who does the domestic work, goes shopping for the
kitchen and likes to cook her husband’s favourite dishes.72
Through media depictions, the First Lady’s duties reach such a point that sacrific-
ing her life to those of her husband and her children is normalized. Both newspapers
highlight their patience, their fondness and unconditional support for their hus-
bands. This is the case for Mevhibe Ino n€u,73 Reşide Bayar,74 Nermin Erbakan75 and
Hayr€unnisa G€ul.76
The devotion and sacrifices of First Ladies are not pictured as part of a relation-
ship based on love and mutual support of two equals but rather affirm the patriar-
chal conception of femininity and patriarchal subjection of women to men.77 Lemish

































self-sacrifice exhibited by the woman in relieving her husband of any responsibility in
the private sphere the better she is portrayed by the media’.78 This point also applies
to the Turkish case. Yet media depictions are not only about the roles of these
women as First Ladies and they are not only functional in the sense that they make
sure that the president or prime minister can do his job properly. They go beyond the
husband’s term of office and relate to the lives of the women and to Turkish woman-
hood at large. The fact that the information about the First Ladies cited above is
mostly given in biographical pieces illustrates this point. These characteristics – devo-
tion to the husband, self-sacrifice and performing domestic duties – are deemed as
such important parts of the lives of these women that they have to be mentioned in
their life stories. In other words, these are characteristics that make them what they
are, regardless of their husbands’ terms of office.
As expected, the primarily domestic role of the First Ladies significantly limits
their place in the public realm as active citizens, in which they can exist only under
certain conditions. Zaman’s praise of Hayr€unnisa G€ul for always smiling, not talking
too much and chatting briefly with political journalists, while refraining from talking
about politics, is telling in this regard.79 While voluntary work in charity organiza-
tions is viewed in a positive light,80 First Ladies are discouraged from taking part in
active politics. Criticism of Rahşan Ecevit can be seen as an example of this. Any
time she played an important role in the decision-making process of the party –
which she was in fact eligible to do as she was also a high-ranking party member – it
was seen as the weakening of her husband’s power and a deviation from proper poli-
tics.81 A similar situation is valid for Semra €Ozal, whose political manoeuvres were
viewed as harmful to her husband’s image and to Turkish politics more generally.82
This attitude towards First Ladies should not be seen as denial of access to the
public realm and to politics for women. Since the sociopolitical framework gave
legitimacy to the presence of women in the public space as asexualized and defemi-
nized subjects fully devoted to the nation’s progress,83 the feminine characteristics
which accompany their role prevented First Ladies from being seen as politically
active individuals. As Caha argues, women who were encouraged to take part in pub-
lic affairs managed to do so only after they left their ‘femininity’ in the private
realm.84 Go le identifies these women as the masculine girls of republican fathers.85
This supports Pateman’s claim that there are two ways of existing in the public realm
for women. Either they are the subordinate feminine figure who reproduces the patri-
archal discourse, or they ‘must disavow [their] bodies and act as part of the
brotherhood’.86
The depictions of First Ladies in H€urriyet and Zaman justify the feminist criticism
of media portrayals on the ground that they fixate the gendered separation between
the public sphere of men that is open, rational and political and the closed, emotional
and care-giving world of women.87 It is striking to see that newspapers as diverse as
H€urriyet and Zaman, one secularist and one Islamist, both perpetuate the domestic
image of First Ladies and the masculine definition of the public sphere.
This article takes a snapshot of female representations in the Turkish media from
2002 to 2007. It suggests that while there is a struggle between the secularist and
Islamist media on issues such as Turkish national identity and public visibility,
Islamists and secularist camps are not using polar opposite discourses as far as
































gender representations are concerned. While the Islamists question the parameters of
the nation and the public sphere, the gender boundaries remain intact. Both sides
emphasize and normalize the domestic roles of women. In their public roles, women
are assigned a more symbolic role as the objects of the political struggle in defining
the national image and the nature of the political regime. This shows us how deep
the assumptions on gender roles run, to the extent that they are accepted by both
camps. The conclusion reached by this article should be taken as a call for awareness
to the media regarding the limitations of its gender discourse. It should also be seen
as a reminder that those who want to advocate women’s emancipation need to
rethink their arguments so as to let the women speak for themselves in all spheres of
life.
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Kemalist Kadin Kimligi ve “M€unevver Erkekler”‘, in A.B. Hacımirzaoglu (ed.), 75 Yılda Kadınlar ve
Erkekler (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998); D. Kandiyoti, ‘Gendering the Modern: On Missing
Dimensions in the Study of Turkish Modernity’, in Bozdogan and Kasaba (eds.), Rethinking Moder-
nity and National Identity in Turkey.
15. G€ole, ‘The Gendered Nature of the Public Sphere’, pp.63–6.
16. Kandiyoti, ‘Gendering the Modern’, p.123.
17. F. Keyman, ‘Modernity, Secularism and Islam: The Case of Turkey’, Theory, Culture & Society,
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28. Rahşan Ecevit is the wife of B€ulent Ecevit, prime minister 1974, 1977–79, 1999–2002.
29. Zaman, 2 Nov. 2006, 15 April 2005, 17 May 2003, 29 June 2004, 12 Nov. 2006.
30. White, ‘State Feminism, Modernization, and the Turkish Republican Woman’, p.149.
31. Zaman, 1 May 2007.
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July 2004; E. Ç€olaşan, ‘Çocuk oyuncagı degil bu!’,H€urriyet, 9 Sept. 2006.
82. Semra O zal is the wife of Turgut O zal, prime minister 1983–89, president 1989–93; S€usoy, 7 April
2003.
83. G€okariksel and Mitchell, ‘Veiling, Secularism, and the Neoliberal Subject’, p.155; A. Kadıoglu,
‘Cinselligin Inkarı: B€uy€uk Toplumsal Projelerin Nesnesi Olarak T€urk Kadınları’, in Hacımirzaoglu
(ed.), 75 Yılda Kadınlar ve Erkekler, pp.89–100.
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